Year: 2010

Should you invest in U.S. bonds?

Could the U.S. government default on its bonds?

I’ve been asked many times over the years for advice on investing. “What is the market going to do?” “Should I be invested in stocks or bonds?” And, especially in the last few weeks, “Should I hold U.S. or foreign government bonds?”

A U.S. treasury bill

Those are some good questions!  The answers are not as “good.”  The factors that drive the yields on treasury bills and bonds are complex and, despite Ben Bernanke’s pronouncements to the contrary, less well understood than stock returns, and I don’t have a crystal ball, but I can at least begin to frame an answer to these questions here.  I will come back to expand on this topic over time, as markets, economies, and world events evolve.

The return on both bonds and stocks is measured as the percent change between the market price today, and the cash flows received later.  The cash flows of a bond, namely coupon payments and principal, are specified in a contract; if they are not paid, the issuer is in default, and the bondholder has the right to take them to court.  The cash flows on stock, dividends and capital gains, are residual; they are discretionary, and are paid out only after debt payments and other obligations are paid.  For this reason, bonds are considered to be less risky than stocks, and the nominal yields on bonds are generally lower than those of stocks.   The risk-adjusted returns on stocks and bonds may be the same, but the nominal yields on bonds are typically lower.

There is an important distinction between the nature of the returns on bonds and stocks. With bonds, the future cash flows are known.  Movements in the bond’s yield are determined simultaneously with movements in the bond’s price. Once a bond is issued, only changes in interest rates (yield, risk) drive unexpected changes in its price.  Stock prices, on the other hand, fluctuate as either risk or residual cash flows change.  As a result, changes in a bond’s price, hypothetically at least, are a much cleaner indicator of the market’s expectations of future market rates of interest than a stock’s price.

One problem that distorts the information about expected future interest rates that is revealed by changes in the bond’s price is that bonds are less frequently traded than stocks, so the price data on bonds is less comprehensive and complete. In addition, the reported price data that form the basis of bond yield models often diverge from actual market-clearing prices, so that bond pricing models may not describe actual market behavior. Lastly, there is such a tremendous volume of economic and policy information, some of it conflicting, that is crammed into this one variable, the bond price which, given the coupon and principal, summarizes the market’s referendum on future interest rates.

by Sherry Jarrell

Next time: Sources and types of risk in U.S. and other bond prices.

In praise of Yves Smith

Helping thousands better understand this crisis

Yves’ Blog Naked Capitalism has been mentioned many times on Learning from Dogs.  Indeed, she was one of the Blog authors highlighted recently in this Post.

Yves Smith

I fail to understand how she finds the hours in the day to write in such detail – but those of us interested in getting under the skin of our present economic situation are all the better for it.  Here’s a great example that was published on the 23rd February.  I quote the opening paragraphs and then link to the rest of her post. From here on is her piece:

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Martin Wolf, the Financial Times’ highly respected chief economics editor, weighs in with a pretty pessimistic piece tonight. This makes for a companion to Peter Boone and Simon Johnson’s Doomsday cycle post from yesterday.

Let us cut to the chase of Wolf’s argument:

Now, after the implosion, we witness the extraordinary rescue efforts. So what happens next? We can identify two alternatives: success and failure.

By “success”, I mean reignition of the credit engine in high-income deficit countries. So private sector spending surges anew, fiscal deficits shrink and the economy appears to being going back to normal, at last. By “failure” I mean that the deleveraging continues, private spending fails to pick up with any real vigour and fiscal deficits remain far bigger, for far longer, than almost anybody now dares to imagine. This would be post-bubble Japan on a far wider scale.

Yves here. Notice he associates success and failure with polar options. But how can you “reignite the credit engine” when the financial system is undercapitalized even before allowing for the need to take further writedowns? The IMF has found the converse in its study of 124 banking crises, that purging bad debt is a painful but necessary precursor to growth. So I fail to understand how Wolf envisages that “skip Go, collect $200″ of releveraging quickly comes about. And in fact, it turns out that Wolf’s “success” is a straw man:

[to read the rest click here, Ed]

By Paul Handover