I agree that the situation regarding the FADEC systems appears to have been extremely unsatisfactory; but that does not mean that it was the cause of this incident. The repeated re-examination of the circumstances of this incident contain much such discussions based on the idea that because there are doubts in one area, there must be doubts in all areas. This does not follow.

This whole incident was tragic for all concerned, not least because, as the inquiry found, it was so easily avoidable. Much of the language of the reports is couched in jargon, so allow me to attempt to interpret what they are saying.

When flying, one is legally required to operate according to one of two sets of rules: Visual Flight Rules (VFR) or Instrument Flight Rules (IFR). At the time of the collision, the inquiry concluded that they were flying in cloud, therefore they were not operating according to VFR. To operate according to IFR they were required to abide by whatever rules the military specify under these circumstances to avoid the terrain [the civil requirement is to be above the Minimum Safe Altitude (MSA) which is 1000 feet above any obstacle within 5 miles of their track]; evidently they did not avoid the terrain and were therefore not operating under IFR. So they were not operating according to either sets of rules. Now this is hard to say, and many pilots have got away with many things over many years, but the plain fact is that this is not allowed.

In general terms, the inquiry found: that they had been operating under VFR at low level over the sea below a low cloudbase and that they entered a climb into cloud and flew over the land whilst below the MSA; in other words, that they were breaking the rules by cutting a corner, in vertical navigation terms. It is highly likely that many other pilots have performed similar manoeuvres as in the vast majority of cases the aircraft will outclimb the incline of the terrain; but that does make it legal or safe. As I understand it, the inquiry also found that they very nearly succeeded, and might well have done so were it not for a strong tailwind which flattened the profile of their climb.

The implication of the inquiry’s findings are that the correct action under the circumstances was: to remain over the sea (by turning away from the land); to climb above the MSA (for the next overland leg of the flight); and then to proceed over the land. As no reason had been given that any faults, for example in the engine control systems, could have prevented them from turning, they found that all such information was peripheral to this point. On this basis, after they crossed the coast below the MSA, anything that happened or didn’t happen, expect for turning back out to sea, is irrelevant because they should not have been there.

To draw an analogy with the findings of the inquiry in this case, consider a head-on collision between two cars on a motorway in which one of them had been heading the wrong way down the carriageway. One might argue interminably about which car had been in which lane at what time and who had braked and/or swerved in which direction and conclude that there were significant doubts about many of these issues. But that is all irrelevant because the car travelling the wrong way along the carriageway simply should not have been there. The driver should not have either entered the carriageway heading in the wrong direction or turned around on the carriageway or whatever resulted in that situation; and, having realised that that situation had occurred or was about to occur, should have either stopped or moved onto the emergency lane.

In my opinion, if someone wishes to question the findings of the inquiry then they need to question the overall case made by the inquiry. To question the accuracy and importance of evidence in areas which the inquiry found to be irrelevant does not, in my opinion, question its findings.

John

The point is, the Chinook’s electronics were KNOWN to be faulty to the point where the government was SUING the company who supplied them and the chief RAF pilot refused to fly the thing.

The BLAME (if blame there must be, and one wouldn’t make such a fuss if the two probably-innocent pilots hadn’t been blamed with no evidence) must surely be on the person or persons who allowed a defective aircraft to fly.

It’s as simple as that.

So much information exchange, questioning and debate has taken place over this tragic incident, that perhaps we will never arrive at any settled view of it.

In 2002, when it was reinvestigated, I read a considerable amount of detailed information on the subject; it is publicly available and online. So, now, I am tempted to retrieve numerous links to it as a basis for expressing my view. However, I see that the point that I wished to make was already made on January 7, 2010 in the House of Lords by, ex-Marshall of the Royal Air Force, Lord Craig of Radley; see his comment on this page: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200910/ldhansrd/text/100107-0002.htm.

While I am aware that this has become an emotive incident, my limited flying experience offers me a limited, but useful, perspective on it; it also generates the often described and deeply chastening feeling of “there, but for the grace of God, go I”. However. the continual and repetitive digging up of old information is not likely to contribute to any significantly or helpfully new analysis.

In my opinion, anyone thinking of discussing this incident would do well to express their answer to the question: “was the aircraft, at the time of the collision, operating under Visual Flight Rules or Instrument Flight Rules?”, and if the meaning of the question is outside their experience, then they have their starting point.

On the above question, I agree with the RAF Board of Inquiry whose opinion is based firstly on the answer to this question being “neither”, and secondly there being no evidence of any reason for this state of affairs. And, if this is so, then there (despite all the thoughts, sympathies and pangs of personal guilt of those of us who have flown) is your answer.

I believe that that is an adequate explanation of the situation. If more practical explanations would help, then I am happy to try to provide them. However, as I implied above, there is the potential consequence that the discussion leads to yet another rehearsal of all the same arguments, to no end when they have already been reported so that anyone can read them.

John